Example sentences of "it could [not/n't] be [verb] that " in BNC.

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1 Mr McCormick submitted that if any one of the mother 's reasons was possibly valid then it could not be said that the mother 's refusal to consent was outside the reasonable band .
2 Although I suggested in the last chapter that it was easier for Brian Way than for Peter Slade to challenge the formal drama traditions within the schools , it could not be said that either of them had very much impact on what drama meant and still means to interested people outside our educational institutions .
3 They accepted that Mr Goodman would suffer financial hardship as a result , but said that they were not in a position to judge whether his dismissal had been justified , so that it could not be said that his difficulties had been caused by the company 's conduct .
4 When the last payment was made on 12 February 1990 , it could not be said that the accountants would necessarily be benefited by a surplus of £2,310 to set against fees for work done earlier but unpaid .
5 Mrs Frizzell eased herself — it could not be said that she exactly pushed — through the crowd so that she was next to Mrs Hnatiuk , while Maxie stopped to talk to clients .
6 As the Court of Appeal put it : ‘ Somebody was not telling the truth and it could not be said that it was not a relevant matter for the jury to be told that one man had been dishonest in the past . ’
7 ( 3 ) That since it could not be said that the jury would inevitably have convicted the defendant if before the trial the defence had been given the statement of the deceased 's husband and the two statements of her sister , if the jury had properly been directed with regard to evidence as to the defendant 's previous good character , and if they had received guidance from the judge on their problem concerning the evidence , the proviso to section 14(1) of the Judicature ( Appellate Jurisdiction ) Act could not be applied to uphold the conviction ; and that , accordingly , the case would be remitted to the Court of Appeal of Jamaica with the direction that it should quash the conviction and either enter a verdict of acquittal or order a new trial , whichever it considered proper in the interests of justice ( post , p. 169C–D , G–H ) .
8 In the case of two of the charges , the court held that , Mrs. Aboody having come to the bank herself to execute the charges , it could not be said that the bank left it to the husband to obtain the wife 's signature .
9 ( 2 ) Granting the application , that the central objective of the category of public interest immunity involved was the maintenance of an honourable , disciplined , law-abiding and uncorrupt police force ; that therefore , in view of the public disquiet understandably aroused by proven malpractice of some members of the disbanded West Midlands Serious Crime Squad , and of the extensive publicity already attaching to the authority 's documents following B. 's successful appeal , it could not be said that those who had co-operated in the authority 's investigation would regret that co-operation , or that future generations of potential witnesses would withhold it , if the court were to release the documents to the applicants to enable them to defeat if they could an allegedly corrupt claim in damages ; that the imperative public interest in the case was that the applicants had a proper opportunity of obtaining the evidence they sought so that the grave allegations which they made , and were the same allegations that had troubled the Court of Appeal sufficiently to allow B. 's appeal , could be properly tested in the courts ; and that , accordingly , B. 's undertaking would be varied to allow him to hand over to the applicants those of the authority 's documents which were incorporated in his appeal bundle , the applicants for their part undertaking to use those documents only for the purposes of defending the present libel proceedings pursued against them ( post , pp. 927G — 928A , B ) .
10 Held , dismissing the appeal , that the expression ‘ is suffering … significant harm ’ in section 31(2) ( a ) of the Children Act 1989 referred to the point in time immediately before the process of protecting the child began , so that , in determining whether the first threshold condition of section 31(2) was satisfied , the court had to consider the position before the commencement of the voluntary care when the children were with the mother ; that the condition in section 31(2) ( b ) related to care by the parent or carer whose lack of care had caused the significant harm to the child and not to the care which might be given by other carers if no care order were to be made , which only became relevant once the threshold conditions under section 31(2) had been satisfied in deciding whether or not a care order should be made ; and that it could not be said that the family proceedings court had been wrong in concluding , first , that the threshold conditions were satisfied and , secondly , on the evidence , that a care order to the local authority was the appropriate order ( post , pp. 1013H — 1014A , E–F , H — 1015B ) .
11 ( 3 ) That ( per Lord Mackay of Clashfern L.C. and Lord Griffiths ) on the true construction of section 63 of the Finance Act 1976 the taxpayers were assessable on the extra cost of providing the benefit , and from the point of view of expense incurred it could not be said that its provision involved significant extra cost to the school ; that ( Lord Mackay of Clashfern L.C. dissenting ) reference should be made to Hansard to resolve the ambiguity in section 63 , and that the Parliamentary history disclosed that the Act of 1976 was passed on the basis that the effect of sections 61 and 63 thereof was to assess in-house benefits , and particularly concerning education for teachers ' children , on the marginal costs to the employer and not on a proportion of the total costs incurred in providing the service both for the public and the employee ; and that section 63 should be construed accordingly ( post , pp. 1036C–E , F–G , 1039B , C , G , 1040B , 1042C–D , 1063A , H — 1064A , C , 1067A ) .
12 As the company was a separate legal entity , and in the particular circumstances ( through its directing mind and will ) had consented to the husband 's drawing the cheques , it could not be said that he had appropriated the company 's property .
13 This argument could be regarded as a rebuttable presumption , but then the inexorable logic of the theory breaks down ; it could not be said that legal rules were always to be determined by the ordinary courts .
14 It could not be said that a peace had been finally made because old habits in Alexandra would not die a final death and made her still reserved , a little wary .
15 Since the whole process took only a few seconds for each blank and the woman was working full-time it could not be denied that this woman knew , from her own sensory experience , a great deal about the making of magnets .
16 In accordance with that view , the final conclusion expressed by the Advocate General was that , in the circumstances of the Conforama and Marchandise cases , it could not be concluded that the obstacles created exceeded what was necessary for the attainment of the objective pursued or that they were out of proportion thereto .
17 Lewis once remarked to a colleague during the Attlee premiership of 1945–51 , and quite without irony , that it could not be disputed that the prime minister was an agent of the Devil .
18 He said that the agreement was on its face unduly restrictive having regard to : ( a ) its likely duration ; ( b ) the publishers ' right to assign copyright in songs which they had acquired in full under the agreement , so that it could not be argued that they would be unlikely to act oppressively and so damage their goodwill ; ( c ) the fact that the publishers were not bound to publish or promote the songwriter 's work if they chose not to do so , so that he might earn nothing , and his talents be sterilised , contrary to the public interest ; and ( d ) the absence of any provision entitling the songwriter to terminate the agreement .
19 In Rogers v. Parish ( Scarborough ) Ltd. ( 1986 ) the Court of Appeal said it could not be assumed that the statutory definition of merchantable quality ( which dates from 1973 ) was merely a codification of earlier judicial pronouncements upon the meaning of merchantable quality ; pre-1973 cases therefore should not be relied upon .
20 Indeed , the House of Lords expressly approved the earlier judgment in Al Saudi Banque and Others v Clark Pixley ( 1989 ) 3 All ER 361 in which it was held that auditors did not owe a duty of care to a number of banks because it could not be established that the auditors knew either that the company 's accounts were to be shown to the banks or that the banks would rely on them in reaching decisions as lenders .
21 This leaves us to assume that the beneficiary ought to pay in the event that ( iii ) it could not be shown that the testator , had he known the land was pledged , would have left something else or ( iv ) the testator did not know the land was pledged .
22 It could not be suggested that these justices in the instant case did not take time to consider the matter and it is not suggested , nor could it be , that they did not take a great deal of care in carrying out their duties .
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