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Example sentences of "the justices had " in BNC.

No	Sentence
1	The Justices had power to seize for the king the bailiwicks of Forest wardens and foresters of fee who were guilty of misconduct in office , and on occasion removed unpaid Forest officers such as the verderers .
2	Held , dismissing the appeal , the issue was whether , on June 13 , the justices had any jurisdiction to set aside the convictions recorded on May 16 .
3	The applicants accepted that the justices had jurisdiction to make such an order but contended that they had erred in law in making it on the facts of this case .
4	It was impossible to say that the order made by the justices had any foundation in law and they had erred in principle in making it ; MacDougall v. Knight [ 1889 ] A.C. 194 , Scott v. Scott [ 1913 ] A.C.417 , Att. -Gen. v. Leveller Magazine Ltd .
5	( 2 ) That a secure accommodation order could only be made if the provisions of subsection ( 1 ) were satisfied and the justices had to consider the statutory criteria and then formulate their reasons within the criteria ; that the justices ' reasons clearly demonstrated that they had not considered whether the order was necessary to protect the child from harm if he was likely to abscond from other types of accommodation ; and that , therefore , the appeal would have to be allowed but the court would make an interim order restricting the child 's liberty for three weeks within which time the matter should be reheard ( post , pp. 93C–F , 94H — 95B , 96G–H , 98D ) .
6	There was evidence before the justices as to the local authority 's aims and objectives in this difficult case which the justices had to assess .
7	( 2 ) Allowing the appeal , that before making the prohibited steps orders the justices should have informed the parties of their intention and given them an opportunity to make submissions as to whether such orders were appropriate ; that the justices had had no jurisdiction to make an order prohibiting the parents from having contact with each other because such contact was not a step which could be taken by a parent in meeting his responsibility towards his child and thus was outside the terms of section 8(1) of the Children Act 1989 ; that , on the evidence they accepted , the justices had been plainly wrong to refuse to make the interim care orders ; and that , accordingly , the court would substitute interim care orders relating to both children ( post , pp. 271B–D , H — 272A , F , H — 273A ) .
8	( 2 ) Allowing the appeal , that before making the prohibited steps orders the justices should have informed the parties of their intention and given them an opportunity to make submissions as to whether such orders were appropriate ; that the justices had had no jurisdiction to make an order prohibiting the parents from having contact with each other because such contact was not a step which could be taken by a parent in meeting his responsibility towards his child and thus was outside the terms of section 8(1) of the Children Act 1989 ; that , on the evidence they accepted , the justices had been plainly wrong to refuse to make the interim care orders ; and that , accordingly , the court would substitute interim care orders relating to both children ( post , pp. 271B–D , H — 272A , F , H — 273A ) .
9	The local authority appealed against the orders and sought an interim care order on the grounds that ( 1 ) the justices had erred in law when they had made the order preventing the parents from having contact with each other as contact between adults was not a step which could be taken by a parent in meeting his responsibilities towards his child and thus fell outside the terms of section 8(1) of the Children Act 1989 ; ( 2 ) there had been no application for a section 8 order and before exercising powers under section 10(1) ( b ) of the Act of 1989 the justices should have invited the parties to make representations , and the failure to do so was a material irregularity ; ( 3 ) the justices , having found as a fact that the parents had been in continuous contact and there were grounds for believing that the children would suffer harm , had been plainly wrong in refusing to make the interim care order in respect of both children in that they had failed to have regard to the facts that both parents had colluded over injuries to D. , the mother had lied when she had stated that there had been no contact with the father , the father had been in breach of a bail order there had been a violent incident on 23 November 1991 which had involved both parents , the mother had refused to be accommodated with the children in a mother and baby home , and the mother had changed her mind about the adoption of R. ; and ( 4 ) in all the circumstances the order which would have been in the best interests of the children and which the justices should have made was an interim care order .
10	By a notice of motion dated 14 February 1992 the local authority appealed against those parts of the order which directed that there should be no contact between the father and the girl until after the local authority review and that there should be supervised contact between the girl and her half-sister , on the grounds that ( 1 ) the justices had been wrong in law in failing to invite the parties to comment on the agreed proposals for contact ; ( 2 ) the justices had been wrong in law in failing to indicate to the parties the nature of the orders for contact which they proposed to make , thereby depriving the parties of the opportunity to make submissions relating to those proposals ; ( 3 ) the justices had wrongly exercised their discretion in authorising the local authority to refuse contact to the girl by the father for only six months when they had found as a fact , inter alia , that the father had abused the girl over a period of at least 18 months ; ( 4 ) the justices had been wrong to impose the condition of supervision on contact between the girl and her half-sister when there had been no application for such contact to be supervised , the evidence was that the half-sister had been enjoying unsupervised contact and that there was no evidence that there was any risk of the girl coming into contact with her father while having contact with her half-sister , and the justices had heard evidence that the local authority were considering placing the girl with her half-sister and by their order they had precluded the local authority from making such a placement and had fettered the discretion of the local authority ; and ( 5 ) the order was therefore contrary to the girl 's best interests .
11	By a notice of motion dated 14 February 1992 the local authority appealed against those parts of the order which directed that there should be no contact between the father and the girl until after the local authority review and that there should be supervised contact between the girl and her half-sister , on the grounds that ( 1 ) the justices had been wrong in law in failing to invite the parties to comment on the agreed proposals for contact ; ( 2 ) the justices had been wrong in law in failing to indicate to the parties the nature of the orders for contact which they proposed to make , thereby depriving the parties of the opportunity to make submissions relating to those proposals ; ( 3 ) the justices had wrongly exercised their discretion in authorising the local authority to refuse contact to the girl by the father for only six months when they had found as a fact , inter alia , that the father had abused the girl over a period of at least 18 months ; ( 4 ) the justices had been wrong to impose the condition of supervision on contact between the girl and her half-sister when there had been no application for such contact to be supervised , the evidence was that the half-sister had been enjoying unsupervised contact and that there was no evidence that there was any risk of the girl coming into contact with her father while having contact with her half-sister , and the justices had heard evidence that the local authority were considering placing the girl with her half-sister and by their order they had precluded the local authority from making such a placement and had fettered the discretion of the local authority ; and ( 5 ) the order was therefore contrary to the girl 's best interests .
12	By a notice of motion dated 14 February 1992 the local authority appealed against those parts of the order which directed that there should be no contact between the father and the girl until after the local authority review and that there should be supervised contact between the girl and her half-sister , on the grounds that ( 1 ) the justices had been wrong in law in failing to invite the parties to comment on the agreed proposals for contact ; ( 2 ) the justices had been wrong in law in failing to indicate to the parties the nature of the orders for contact which they proposed to make , thereby depriving the parties of the opportunity to make submissions relating to those proposals ; ( 3 ) the justices had wrongly exercised their discretion in authorising the local authority to refuse contact to the girl by the father for only six months when they had found as a fact , inter alia , that the father had abused the girl over a period of at least 18 months ; ( 4 ) the justices had been wrong to impose the condition of supervision on contact between the girl and her half-sister when there had been no application for such contact to be supervised , the evidence was that the half-sister had been enjoying unsupervised contact and that there was no evidence that there was any risk of the girl coming into contact with her father while having contact with her half-sister , and the justices had heard evidence that the local authority were considering placing the girl with her half-sister and by their order they had precluded the local authority from making such a placement and had fettered the discretion of the local authority ; and ( 5 ) the order was therefore contrary to the girl 's best interests .
13	By a notice of motion dated 14 February 1992 the local authority appealed against those parts of the order which directed that there should be no contact between the father and the girl until after the local authority review and that there should be supervised contact between the girl and her half-sister , on the grounds that ( 1 ) the justices had been wrong in law in failing to invite the parties to comment on the agreed proposals for contact ; ( 2 ) the justices had been wrong in law in failing to indicate to the parties the nature of the orders for contact which they proposed to make , thereby depriving the parties of the opportunity to make submissions relating to those proposals ; ( 3 ) the justices had wrongly exercised their discretion in authorising the local authority to refuse contact to the girl by the father for only six months when they had found as a fact , inter alia , that the father had abused the girl over a period of at least 18 months ; ( 4 ) the justices had been wrong to impose the condition of supervision on contact between the girl and her half-sister when there had been no application for such contact to be supervised , the evidence was that the half-sister had been enjoying unsupervised contact and that there was no evidence that there was any risk of the girl coming into contact with her father while having contact with her half-sister , and the justices had heard evidence that the local authority were considering placing the girl with her half-sister and by their order they had precluded the local authority from making such a placement and had fettered the discretion of the local authority ; and ( 5 ) the order was therefore contrary to the girl 's best interests .
14	By a notice of motion dated 14 February 1992 the local authority appealed against those parts of the order which directed that there should be no contact between the father and the girl until after the local authority review and that there should be supervised contact between the girl and her half-sister , on the grounds that ( 1 ) the justices had been wrong in law in failing to invite the parties to comment on the agreed proposals for contact ; ( 2 ) the justices had been wrong in law in failing to indicate to the parties the nature of the orders for contact which they proposed to make , thereby depriving the parties of the opportunity to make submissions relating to those proposals ; ( 3 ) the justices had wrongly exercised their discretion in authorising the local authority to refuse contact to the girl by the father for only six months when they had found as a fact , inter alia , that the father had abused the girl over a period of at least 18 months ; ( 4 ) the justices had been wrong to impose the condition of supervision on contact between the girl and her half-sister when there had been no application for such contact to be supervised , the evidence was that the half-sister had been enjoying unsupervised contact and that there was no evidence that there was any risk of the girl coming into contact with her father while having contact with her half-sister , and the justices had heard evidence that the local authority were considering placing the girl with her half-sister and by their order they had precluded the local authority from making such a placement and had fettered the discretion of the local authority ; and ( 5 ) the order was therefore contrary to the girl 's best interests .
15	In the event the justices had not completed their task by 12 noon and it was at 12.45 p.m. that they returned to court to state their reasons .
16	The grounds of appeal were , inter alia , that ( 1 ) the justices had exercised their discretion to award costs on the wrong principles as it had not been shown that the local authority had acted in bad faith or unreasonable in the performance of its statutory duties or had acted unreasonably in the conduct of the proceedings before the court ; ( 2 ) there were no circumstances which justified the making of the costs order ; ( 3 ) the justice should have found that there were good reasons for the local authority to be concerned about the father 's ability to care for the children , the local authority was not bound to adopt the view of the guardian ad litem and the local authority had communicated the decision not to oppose the father 's application within a reasonable time on receiving the report of the guardian ad litem ; ( 4 ) the justices had been wrong to assume that the change in the view of the local authority amounted to an admission that the views of the local authority had been wrong all the time .
17	The grounds of appeal were , inter alia , that ( 1 ) the justices had exercised their discretion to award costs on the wrong principles as it had not been shown that the local authority had acted in bad faith or unreasonable in the performance of its statutory duties or had acted unreasonably in the conduct of the proceedings before the court ; ( 2 ) there were no circumstances which justified the making of the costs order ; ( 3 ) the justice should have found that there were good reasons for the local authority to be concerned about the father 's ability to care for the children , the local authority was not bound to adopt the view of the guardian ad litem and the local authority had communicated the decision not to oppose the father 's application within a reasonable time on receiving the report of the guardian ad litem ; ( 4 ) the justices had been wrong to assume that the change in the view of the local authority amounted to an admission that the views of the local authority had been wrong all the time .
18	The local authority appealed against that part of the order by which the justices purported to direct that the guardian ad litem be allowed to have continued involvement with L. on the grounds , inter alia , that ( 1 ) the justices had no jurisdiction to attach a condition to the care order which had been agreed by the parties and approved by the justices ; ( 2 ) in the alternative , the justices had no jurisdiction to make the direction , because ( i ) it had the effect of fettering the discretion of the local authority in the exercise of its functions under section 33 of the Children Act 1989 , and ( ii ) the justices had no power to order the guardian ad litem to ‘ have continued involvement ’ once the proceedings had been concluded by the making of an order under section 41 of the Children Act 1989 ; and ( 3 ) the justices had no jurisdiction to make a direction which anticipated a further application before the court , the justices power to give directions in respect of future applications being confined to a prohibition of further specified applications under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989 .
19	The local authority appealed against that part of the order by which the justices purported to direct that the guardian ad litem be allowed to have continued involvement with L. on the grounds , inter alia , that ( 1 ) the justices had no jurisdiction to attach a condition to the care order which had been agreed by the parties and approved by the justices ; ( 2 ) in the alternative , the justices had no jurisdiction to make the direction , because ( i ) it had the effect of fettering the discretion of the local authority in the exercise of its functions under section 33 of the Children Act 1989 , and ( ii ) the justices had no power to order the guardian ad litem to ‘ have continued involvement ’ once the proceedings had been concluded by the making of an order under section 41 of the Children Act 1989 ; and ( 3 ) the justices had no jurisdiction to make a direction which anticipated a further application before the court , the justices power to give directions in respect of future applications being confined to a prohibition of further specified applications under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989 .
20	The local authority appealed against that part of the order by which the justices purported to direct that the guardian ad litem be allowed to have continued involvement with L. on the grounds , inter alia , that ( 1 ) the justices had no jurisdiction to attach a condition to the care order which had been agreed by the parties and approved by the justices ; ( 2 ) in the alternative , the justices had no jurisdiction to make the direction , because ( i ) it had the effect of fettering the discretion of the local authority in the exercise of its functions under section 33 of the Children Act 1989 , and ( ii ) the justices had no power to order the guardian ad litem to ‘ have continued involvement ’ once the proceedings had been concluded by the making of an order under section 41 of the Children Act 1989 ; and ( 3 ) the justices had no jurisdiction to make a direction which anticipated a further application before the court , the justices power to give directions in respect of future applications being confined to a prohibition of further specified applications under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989 .
21	The local authority appealed against that part of the order by which the justices purported to direct that the guardian ad litem be allowed to have continued involvement with L. on the grounds , inter alia , that ( 1 ) the justices had no jurisdiction to attach a condition to the care order which had been agreed by the parties and approved by the justices ; ( 2 ) in the alternative , the justices had no jurisdiction to make the direction , because ( i ) it had the effect of fettering the discretion of the local authority in the exercise of its functions under section 33 of the Children Act 1989 , and ( ii ) the justices had no power to order the guardian ad litem to ‘ have continued involvement ’ once the proceedings had been concluded by the making of an order under section 41 of the Children Act 1989 ; and ( 3 ) the justices had no jurisdiction to make a direction which anticipated a further application before the court , the justices power to give directions in respect of future applications being confined to a prohibition of further specified applications under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989 .
22	The local authority says that the justices had no power to add a direction of any sort to the care order and , in particular , they had no power to order that the guardian ad litem be allowed to have continued involvement with L. , so that , effectively , he could apply if he felt that the rehabilitation process was not succeeding .
23	‘ Undoubtedly if the justices had proceeded to adjudicate on the case either by convicting or by acquitting the defendant , that would have afforded ground for a good plea to the indictment , but I can not see why the fact that the justices at first said they would deal summarily with the case and afterwards changed their minds should be said to have deprived quarter sessions of jurisdiction .
24	The grounds of the appeal were , inter alia , that ( 1 ) there was no sufficient evidence that the requirements of section 31 of the Children Act 1989 had been satisfied ; ( 2 ) the justices had made the order on the ground that to do otherwise would cause harm to the boy , when the Act required the justices to find that ‘ significant harm ’ would be caused before making the order ; and ( 3 ) the justices failed to state their reasons adequately .
25	The fact that there was a month 's gap between the early part of the hearing and the second part of the hearing is clearly undesirable and , if the justices had had any idea that the case was going to take five days and involve a gap of a month , I imagine they would have ordered the case to be transferred .
26	Fifth , the justices had no doubt that the mother was an inadequate parent .
27	Seventh , the justices had no doubts as to the care the grandparents could give the children but that would result in the children being separated and the justices felt very strongly that that should not happen .
28	It has been held under an equivalent section in England that , an adjournment having once been allowed on the ground that some requirement was not complied with , the justices had no power to adjourn a second time because another irregularity had occurred : R. v. Poole JJ. [ 1951 ] 2 T.L.R. 261 .
29	This was held to be incorrect , but irrelevant ; incorrect , because a mere sense of alarm was insufficient to give rise to a fear of a breach of the peace , and irrelevant because the justices had found ( or there was evidence from which they could have found ) that the constables reasonably believed that the defendant 's own behaviour was likely to constitute a breach of the peace .
30	If the justices had applied the wrong criteria as to what constituted a breach of the peace in the case of the mother-in-law , it is difficult to see how the court could have been so sure that the justices had applied the right criteria to the decision of the policeman .